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Several months ago the main topic in Serbia was the Feasibility Study. Everyone was
talking about it, mostly completely unaware and uninformed about the nature, form and use
of it. Nevertheless, the outcome was important: would it be positive or not? The Feasibility
Study was some kind of Hamlet s dilemma for the country: "To be, or not to be?" At least,
one ICTY indictee went to The Hague every week. The Government crossed the Rubicon.
Public attention was absolute and, finally, on 12 April 2005, Serbia and Montenegro got a
positive assessment on its preparedness to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment (SAA) with the European Union (EV).
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1. Introduction
European Commission (EC) recommended
that EU should start negotiating a new relationship
with Serbia and Montenegro. "This is the start of the
European road for Serbia and Montenegro" as Olli
Rehn said before Belgrade University students, on
18 April 2005. The Council of EU welcomed and
confirmed the same assessment on 25 April 2005.
Officials of the Government of Serbia were over-
whelmed as if the country had got an EU member-
ship offer. Eurosceptics cynically underestimated the
whole event, arguing that "feasibility study can not
be spread over bread". Common people were mostly
confused without having any clue what did the Fea-
sibility Study really mean. Anyhow, there was a posi-
tive atmosphere throughout the country, the first good
news since the "honey-moon" period after the fall of
Milosevic's regime. No doubt, this outcome is a
watershed in perception that European future has
been assured for the country. EU integration replaced,
as main foreign policy goal, NATO's Partnership for
Peace program which was a kind of obsession for a
long time, in the same way as feasibility study these
days. Today's State Union is trying to make condi-
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tions for regaining a status of favorable European
partner that was lost some 15 years ago.
Since the beginning of its relations with Eu-
ropean Communities (latter European Union), Ser-
bia and Montenegro has passed through three differ-
ent state arrangements: Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (FRY) and, lastly, State Union Serbia and
Montenegro. Searching for the first step in building
these relations would lead us to mid-sixties, exactly
to 2 December 1967 and the signing of the Declara-
tion on Relations, the first act which European Com-
munities have signed with a socialist country in its,
so far, twenty years long existence. The Declaration
has shaped a political framework for further mod-
ules of economic cooperation, realized shortly after-
wards through two trade agreements with European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1970 and 1973.
Agreement on Cooperation with EEC, signed in Bel-
grade, on 2 April 1980, was encouraging continua-
tion of this process which opened a wide range of
cooperation opportunities in economy, trade, agri-
culture, traffic, tourism, science and social area.
Moreover, this Agreement established the EEC-
SFRY Council for Cooperation. Three Financial
Protocols (1980, 1982 and 1991) resulted from that
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Agreement. Also in 1980, the SFRY signed an Agree-
ment with the European Community for Steel and
Coal. The strengthening of the SFRY-EEC relations
looked promising for the country's political and eco-
nomic perspective. But, although in eighties, SFRY
moved its course in trade and cooperation to EEC
political orientation of the country was extensively
directed to the Non-aligned Third World, thus loosing
in that way a chance to expand basically its Euro-
pean prospects. On the eve of the tragic crisis in the
former Yugoslavia, the SFRY entered into the Frame-
work Agreement with the European Community, on
17 December 1990 which included Yugoslavia in the
assistance program for the restructuring of Central
and Eastern Europe (PHARE). It was a paramount
of mutual SFRY-EEC cooperation, a historic moment
for the country that seemed to be the first socialist
country to obtain the status of the EEC Associated
Country. Unfortunately, turn of events in the coun-
try, in 1991, dissolved all optimistic expectancies and
proved the most pessimistic assessments.
Only a year after the inclusion into PHARE
program, when the SFRY was institutionally and fi-
nancially to a large extent linked to European Com-
munities, having a status that could be considered
even more beneficial than the status that would be
offered to the future associate countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, bloody conflicts started and
European Communities imposed sanctions against
the SFRY and suspended the Agreement on Coop-
eration. However, all republics of the former Yugo-
slavia were excluded from these "restrictive meas-
ures" and from the Agreement on Cooperation sus-
pension, except Serbia and Montenegro. Due to the
isolationist nature ofMilosevic 's regime, Serbia and
Montenegro remained far away from the mainstream
of the European integration, taking place in the mean-
time. The Treaty on the European Union (EU), of
1992, transformed European Communities into a
more operational structure, the three-pillar European
Union. New countries became the EU members while
some others entered in association arrangements with
EU. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), con-
sisting of Serbia and Montenegro, was established
on 27 April 1992 and all other republics of the former
Yugoslavia became independent states. From the very
beginning the FRY was an object of the EU (and
UN) sanctions which were suspended on 4 Decem-
ber 1995, in the aftermath of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment. Half a year later, the first high-level EU del-
egation visited Belgrade (Jacques Santer, Head of
the European Commission and Lamberto Dini, Presi-
dent ofthe Council ofEU) offereing a possibility to
reestablish institutional relations between the FRY
and the EU. Alas, instead of taking the chance, re-
gime of Slobodan Milosevic (again) another politi-
cal course, preferring alliance with Russia and
Belarus to a refreshed rapprochement with EU. In
1996 and 1997, due to Milosevic's cheating at local
elections in Serbia and stirring up tension in Kosovo,
the FRY-EU relations took back their worst form,
followed by a new wave of sanctions. With the NATO
air campaign, in 1999, these relations even ceased
to exist (FRY even broke diplomatic relations with
United Kingdom, Germany and France). At the same
time, it was the turning point in the EU's policy to-
wards the region, called ever since: the Western Bal-
kans. In May 1999, the EC proposed improvement
of the existing regional approach to the Balkans, pro-
moting the Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP) which became a main cornerstone in the EU's
policy for the Western Balkans. Consequently, the
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
emerged as a new form of contract between EU and
Western Balkan countries. Also, on the EU initia-
tive, on 10 June 1999, the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe was established. Representatives of
EU and G8 countries, international and financial or-
ganizations and all countries of the region, except
government officials from Belgrade, attended sol-
emn ceremony of the Pact signing, twenty days lat-
ter, in Sarajevo. Nevertheless, the government offi-
cials from Montenegro and representatives of the
democratic opposition of Serbia were present at the
event. Participation in the Stability Pact and possi-
bility of joining the SAP were foreseen for the FRY
but not while Milosevic was in power. Beginning in
1999, EU assistance was made available to demo-
cratically-run municipalities within Serbia under the
EC's Obnova-CARDS program, like projects "En-
ergy for Democracy" and "Schools for a Democratic
Serbia". More ample EU assistance was provided to
the Republic of Montenegro, which distanced itself
from the Milosevic's political mainstream in early
1997. As a result, the Milosevic regime put it under
considerable pressure. The EU therefore provided
direct and continuing support to the Republic of
Montenegro, exempting it from the sanctions against
the FRY and supplying it with substantial material
and technical assistance.
2. Serbian transition to democ-
racy
With the transition to democracy in Belgrade,
on 5 October 2000, the EU moved quickly to ease
the difficult transition period and to give a concrete
and visible signal of support to the population and to
the new authorities. The first international appear-
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ance of the newly elected president of the FRY,
Vojislav Kostunica, was at the European Council
meeting at Biarritz (13-14 October 2000). There, the
EU Heads of State and Government announced that
the sum total of up to € 200.000.000 would be allo-
cated for that winter "to help consolidate democratic
change in the FRY". Sanctions, comprising the oil
and flight embargo, were lifted, except those directed
against Milosevic and his close associates. The EC
undertook an immediate fact-finding mission (9-11
October) and, in discussions with the new authori-
ties, identified key priorities for the Emergency Sup-
port Program. FRY was welcomed as a full partici-
pant in the Stabilization and Association Process and
invited to the Zagreb Summit, on 24 November 2000.
The EC included the entire FRY in the liberalized
EC preferential trade regime for the region (entered
into force on 1 December 2000). As a result, practi-
cally all trade from the FRY to the EU was fully lib-
eralized. By and large most products originating in
the FRY can now enter the EU without quantitative
restrictions and are exempted from customs duties.
These liberal arrangements are even more generous
than those enjoyed by the candidate countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. The FRY signed the
agreement with the European Agency for Reconstruc-
tion (EAR) and EAR office was opened in Belgrade.
Moreover, the EU has supported FRY membership
in international organizations and worked with in-
ternational financial institutions to integrate FRY into
the international financial community. During the
visit of the EC President Romano Prodi to Belgrade,
the FRY formally signed a framework agreement
with EU, on 25 November 2000, which extended the
mandate of the EAR, in charge of managing the
CARDS program, to entire territory of the FRY.
Donors' Conference for the FRY took place on 29
June 2001, to support the economic reform program
in 2001.
For the FRY, Stabilization and Association
Process officially started with the establishment of
the Joint Consultative Task Force (JCTF), on 22
December 2000, as a mechanism that was supposed
to enable the EC and Serbia and Montenegro to ex-
amine the situation in a number of social and eco-
nomic areas, as well as to promote a more efficient
approach to the EU standards. According to the pro-
posal from the Declaration by the EU on the FRY,
issued in Luxembourg, on 9 October 2000, the Zagreb
Summit made a decision of establishing JCTF. Its
first meeting was held on 23 July 2001, and JCTF
had had four more meetings before July 2002. The
JCTF was a technical working group, co-chaired by
representatives of the Presidency of the Council of
the EU, EC and FRY. At their meetings JCTF adopted
joint recommendations, which were binding guide-
lines for further approximation with the EU stand-
ards. JCTF analyzed political and economic reforms,
regional cooperation and fulfillment of international
obligations by the FRY.
The fifth meeting (9-10 July 2002) was fol-
lowed by a long pause in the formal dialogue with
the EU regarding the preparations for the SAA. Be-
sides the necessity to work on specific issues of le-
gal and institutional harmonization with EU, a new
challenge appeared for Serbia and Montenegro. For
a rather long time, internal relations between two
republics burdened a significant advancement in
meeting the requirements for faster and more effi-
cient accession to the EU. Hence, realizing the need
for a redefinition of internal relations inside the state,
the EU would devote itself to finding out an accept-
able and realistic constitutional arrangement. Com-
promise was met on 14 March 2002, with the so-
called the Belgrade Agreement which paved the way
for a new Constitutional Charter, enacted almost a
year latter, on 4 February 2003, enabling creation of
the new State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The
guarantor of the whole arrangement was the EU and
especially its High Representative for Common For-
eign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, after him
sometimes referred to as 'Solania'. The proof of a
doubtless orientation of the EU sponsored state un-
ion, could be found in the articles from the Constitu-
tional Charter stating that its primer goals would be
as follows: " .. .inclusion into European structures,
especially EU ... " and" ... harmonization of acts and
practice with European and international standards."
There are five main jurisdictions of the State Union:
foreign affairs, defence, international economic af-
fairs, internal economic affairs and human and mi-
nority rights. According to the Constitutional Char-
ter, Minister for International Economic Relations
is responsible for "negotiation and coordination of
implementation of international agreements, includ-
ing agreements made with EU ... after the consulta-
tions with respective ministers of the member states."
Therefore, EU has obtained one address to refer, since
only the State Union is a subject of international law
and partner for conclusion of the international agree-
ments.
Something that no one could imagine hap-
pened in March 2003: the assassination of the Ser-
bian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. That event, fol-
lowed by the martial law, for a long time stopped the
country's accession to the EU and considerably
harmed prompt efforst Mr. Djindjic had put in speed-
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ing up that process. On that sad occasion, Chris Patten
emphasized: "We must not allow this terrible crime
to set back the progress being made by his country
towards joining the rest of the European family."
3. Enhanced Permanent Dialogue
between the EU and the SU Serbia
and Montenegro
In the period July 2002 - July 2003 there were
three informal meetings of the representatives of the
EC, EU member states and the State Union of Ser-
bia and Montenegro, where it was concluded that a
new form of cooperation should be introduced as the
Enhanced Permanent Dialogue (EPD). In essence,
EPD was not different from JCTF. It was introduced
in order to ensure a positive assessment in the Feasi-
bility Study, as well as to offer expert consultations
and help. The first EPD meeting of Serbia and
Montenegro and EU was held in July 2003. By 21
April 2005, there were seven meetings. At those
meetings, EC and Serbia and Montenegro estimated
condition of reforms and defined the recommenda-
tions for further activities in the SAP. Special rec-
ommendations were formulated in the area of jus-
tice and home affairs, intellectual and industrial prop-
erty, competition rights and other sector policies.
According to the decisions taken at the Euro-
pean Summit in Thessalonica, held on 21 June 2003,
regarding the European Partnership, a key instrument
of the EU pre-accession strategy for the potential EU
membership candidates. On 14 June 2004, the Coun-
cil of EU adopted, the Decision on the principles,
priorities and conditions contained in the European
Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro. The Part-
nership lists short and mid-term priorities for the
preparations for further integration in the ED. This
mechanism shall exclusively determine relations
between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro until
the SAA has been signed. One of the most important
facts regarding the European Partnership is that the
financial assistance is conditioned by the implemen-
tation of the priorities.
The enactment of the Resolution on Joining
EU by the Parliament of Republic of Serbia, on 13
October 2004, can be considered as a significant step
in outlining the strategic European orientation.
Among other things, the Resolution says: " ... the
faster access of the Republic of Serbia, as a member
state of Serbia and Montenegro State Union, with
full membership to European Union and accessing
Partnership for Peace, is a strategic national goal,
that will be fully and constantly supported by the
National Assembly of Republic of Serbia." Particu-
larly interesting part is the one stating: "[the National
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia] Accepts the
obligation to make active contribution to spreading
European values and introducing the Serbian public
with the importance of our country accessing the
EU."
Trapped in an obstruction ofthe Montenegrin
Government concerning direct elections for the State
Union Parliament, the highest political representa-
tives of Serbia, Montenegro and the State Union,
together with Javier Solana signed an agreement on
7 April 2005, creating conditions for the amendments
of the Constitutional Charter, and solving the prob-
lem of the legitimacy of the current Parliament of
the State Union. According to the Constitutional
Charter, the mandate of the current members of the
parliament expired at the beginning of March. The
main amendment says: "Direct elections to the Par-
liament of Serbia and Montenegro are to be held sepa-
rately, in both member states, once elections for re-
public legislatures are held. The terms of office of
the present members of parliament will be extended
until those elections are held." The Council of EU,
on its meeting on 25 April 2005 welcomed the po-
litical agreement on the constitutional amendments
concerning the issue of direct elections to the State
Union Parliament, and called on the relevant parlia-
ments to ratify that agreement without delay.
Structure in Serbia and Montenegro responsi-
ble for the EU association is represented on three
levels:
1. State Union: Ministry for International Eco-
nomic Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Council for European Integration of Serbia and
Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro European
Integration Office.
2. Republic of Serbia: Ministry for International
Economic Relations, The Serbian Government Coun-
cil for European Integration, Commission for the EU
accession coordination and Serbian European Inte-
gration Office (SEIO).
3. Republic of Montenegro: Ministry for Inter-
national Economic Relations and European Integra-
tion, The Council for European Integrations, The
Commission for Coordination of the European Un-
ion Accession Process.
114 SOUTHEAST EUROPE ON THE WAY iNTO THE EU CIRR
4. SU Serbia and Montengro
links to the EU
The Council for European Integration of
Serbia and Montenegro was founded on 31 July
2003, as an advisory body to the Council of Minis-
ters of Serbia and Montenegro. The main tasks of
the Council are: consideration of the issues concern-
ing the membership of Serbia and Montenegro in
the EU, monitoring, evaluation and steering of the
integration processes, inducing and undertaking
measures and activities relevant for the full and
timely implementation of recommendations made by
the EC. The Council is composed of the President of
Serbia and Montenegro, Prime Ministers of Serbia
and Montenegro, respective ministers from both
member states.
Serbia and Montenegro European Integra-
tion Office was founded on 1 November 2001, by
the FRY Government. The Office is a body of the
Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro,
which operates under supervision and according to
guidelines set by the Ministry of International Eco-
nomic Relations of Serbia and Montenegro. The main
task of the Office is coordination of the association
of Serbia and Montenegro to the EU. In carrying out
this task, the Office closely cooperates with other
official bodies and institutions of the State Union
and with both member states. Activities of the Of-
fice cover four broad thematic areas: coordination
of activities related to SAP, training of public ad-
ministration for issues related to the EU integration,
translation and language editing of acquis
communautaire. Finally, according to the Decision
on establishing the Council for European Integra-
tion of Serbia and Montenegro, the Office is tasked
with carrying out expert and administrative work in
preparation of the Council's sessions and realization
of its conclusions.
The Serbian Government Council for Eu-
ropean Integration was established on 4 Septem-
ber 2002 as a consultative Government body. Its main
tasks are: to monitor, review, evaluate and stream-
line the process of Serbia's association to EU and
provide political support to the activities relating to
the process.
The Council consists of Prime Minister, Deputy
Prime Minister, Government Secretary General, eleven
ministers and the Secretary General of the European
Integration Office. The Prime Minister chairs the
Council. European Integration Office provides tech-
nical support in preparing Council sessions.
Commission for the EU accession coordi-
nation was established by the Serbian Government
decision on 17 October 2002. This was done in ac-
cord with one of the key conclusions reached at the
constitutive session of the Council for European In-
tegration, which pointed out the need for the estab-
lishment of an operational body that would coordi-
nate and streamline the activities of Republic ofSer-
bia's institutions and organizations in the SAP. The
Commission has the following tasks: to propose
measures for setting up and promoting cooperation
between institutions and organizations in Serbia re-
sponsible for passing and implementing European
integration policies, to determine the priorities and
best methods for the approximation of Serbian poli-
cies and regulations with the EU standards, to pro-
pose measures regarding legal harmonization, insti-
tutional changes and reform of policies that Repub-
lic of Serbia is responsible for and to monitor the
implementation of the proposed measures.
Serbian European Integration Office
(SEIO) was established by the decision of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Serbia on 8 March 2004.
SEIO was established following the need to have a
strong authority that would efficiently coordinate the
EU association process. Essentially, SEIO would
build on the activities that were the responsibility of
the European Integration Department of the Serbian
Ministry ofInternational Economic Relations. Thus,
the establishment of SEIO presented a clear institu-
tional determination of the Government to acceler-
ate preparations for the EU integration. The main
tasks of SEIO are: coordinating, initiating, monitor-
ing and reporting on the process of harmonization of
Serbian legislation with the acquis communautaire;
planning, monitoring and promotion of institutional
capacities of the Republic of Serbia considering the
needs resulting from the EU association process.
Also, in cooperation with the relevant public admin-
istration bodies and organizations SEIO coordinates
training for civil servants on the EU matters; initi-
ates, coordinates and monitors public relations and
promotion of activities related to the EU association
process. In addition to this, the Office provides tech-
nical support and organizes meetings of The Serbian
Government Council for European Integration, man-
ages work of the Commission for the EU accession
coordination, liaises with the Serbia and Montenegro
European Integration Office and respective institu-
tions in Montenegro. The ongoing campaign of the
SEIO "Europe at your door" which has both informa-
tive and educative character on EU issues, intended
for common people in the inland of Serbia is note-
worthy. Visiting various Serbian towns, governmen-
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tal officials directly involved in the EU integration
process, together with their European partners from
the Delegation of EC and diplomats from EU mem-
ber countries, strive to explain to the citizens through-
out Serbia, by the direct contacts and through me-
dia, the functioning of the EU, the benefits of fast
progress towards EU and the impact of this process
on the standard and daily life of the citizens.
The Montenegrin Government decided on 6
February 2003 to establish the Ministry for Interna-
tional Economic Relations and European Integra-
tion. The Ministry's responsibilities include: coordi-
nation of all activities on European integration, coop-
eration with EU institutions at all levels, particularly
with regard to the harmonization of the legislation with
the regulations and standards of the EU. Moreover,
the Government established The Council for Euro-
pean Integrations, as advisory body on the EU is-
sues of the Government of the Republic of
Montenegro. The tasks of the Council should be: to
elaborate and propose measures for determination of
the strategy of the Republic of Montenegro for EU
accession, to follow and determine direction for im-
plementation of strategy for accession, to elaborate
and propose measures related to harmonization of leg-
islation and other institutional changes necessary for
successful and efficient process of accession to the
EU. Members of the Council are: President of the
Republic of Montenegro, Prime Minister, Speaker of
the Parliament, Minister for International Economic
Relations and European Integration, President of Con-
stitutional Court and several other distinguished au-
thorities. In addition, Government of Montenegro es-
tablished The Commission for Coordination ofthe
European Union Accession Process, as an expert
group. The Commission tasks should be: coordina-
tion and improvement of activities and cooperation
of ministries, state authorities and institutions which
are competent for enactment and implementation of
policies related to EU accession process; outlining
priorities for harmonization of policies and regula-
tions of the Republic of Montenegro with the Euro-
pean Union standard; proposing measures for harmo-
nization of the legislation, institutional changes and
reform of policies falling within the competence of
the Republic of Montenegro, in accordance with ob-
ligations and requirements deriving from EU acces-
sion process; monitoring the implementation of pro-
posed measures.
The structure established by the Constitutional
Charter and a new State Union is full of shortfalls,
especially concerning contractual relations with the
EU. While Constitutional Charter precisely defines
the state union competences (through the Minister
of the International Economic Relations) in negoti-
ating and treaty making powers, in consultation with
respective ministers from member states, there is
complete uncertainty regarding the responsibilities
in implementation of agreements. The State Union
can be responsible only for coordination of an agree-
ment implementation, albeit there is no clear Con-
stitutional Charter stipulation on what the instru-
ments of the coordination should be. Thus, in fact,
implementation of international agreements is in
charge of members states of the State Union. So, there
is the main institutional problem, how to secure that
SAA will be implemented correctly and efficiently
in the whole territory of the State Union; and how to
provide better coordination among all actors involved
in the EU association process, on three levels. One 0
a few good examples is the Action Plan for harmo-
nization of Trade and Customs system of Serbia and
Montenegro, adopted by the State Union Parliament
on 29 August 2003.
Facing all aforementioned obstacles, and
forced by the necessity to establish a functional state
structure, capable to undertake fast and thorough
steps towards the EU accession, the EU backed the
decision made at the meeting of the Council ofEU,
on 11 October in Luxembourg, to offer to Serbia and
Montenegro a "twin-track" approach to SAA nego-
tiations, with aim to underpin work on Feasibility
Study. The "twin-track" approach would imply a sin-
gle SAA with distinct negotiations with the member
states of the State Union on trade, economic and
possibly other relevant sectoral policies, while con-
tinuing to work with the State Union where it is the
competent authority, i.e. on international political
obligations and human rights. A previous attempt to
conduct a Feasibility Study on Serbia and
Montenegro was stalled in early 2004 due to the lack
of agreement inside the country on how to make the
future Agreement work. Commissioner Chris Patten
said: "We have offered a "twin track" approach for
parts of the Stabilization and Association Agreement,
because we do not want to see Serbia and Montenegro
fall behind its neighbors."
During the visit of the European Commis-
sioner for the enlargement, Olli Rehn, to Belgrade,
in April 2005, a group of 17 nongovernmental ex-
pert organizations has submitted him an appeal ask-
ing for the change of the current instruments of sup-
port not only to Serbia and Montenegro, but also to
other Western Balkan countries on their way to the
EU. The essence of the appeal is the request for
making available pre-accession funds to the West-
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ern Balkan countries, irrespectively of their candi-
date status: "Current instruments are rather exhausted
and are no longer potent enough to address the im-
mense challenges ahead both for the Union and our
country." This appeal claims that it will be very dif-
ficult for potential candidates for the EU member-
ship (Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia) to reach
present candidates (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and
Turkey) to say nothing about old and new EU mem-
bers, without an additional financial support which
has not been foreseen by new EU budget for the pe-
riod 2007 to 2013. Among others, this appeal has
been signed by the European Movement in Serbia,
Civic Initiatives, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights,
Belgrade Centre for European Integration, Centre for
Regionalism, European Law Centre, G 17 Institute,
Comparative Law Institute ...
5. National strategy for
accession to the EU
While all main (democratic) actors in the po-
litical arena in Serbia (and Montenegro) express their
willingness and intention to support European future
of the country there is still a visible lack of compre-
hensible country's strategy for EU accession, com-
prising first of all, frankly taking up responsibilities
for fulfillment of all requirements that SAP presumes.
Regrettably, despite the recent redefinition of internal
constitutional relations inside Serbia and Montenegro
there is no significant will for designing a wide EU
accession strategy that would take into consideration
all particularities, and sound and unhesitating politi-
cal consensus on indispensability of the advanced and
resolute rapprochement to the EU.
It the beginning of September 2004, SEIO ini-
tiated the creation of the National Strategy of the
Republic of Serbia for the accession of Serbia and
Montenegro to the European Union. With political
consensus provided, technical aspect of such a strat-
egy would be easily carried out. Still, the country
needs a conceptual basis, a platform for the deci-
sion- making in the European integration process,
with clear assessment of measures and policies for
navigating in the European integration process. Such
a strategy should be backed by consensus of all rel-
evant subjects in politics, also involving related aca-
demic circles, civil society and wider public.
No doubt, a crucial step on the path of Serbia
towards the EU was made on 5 October 2000, by the
overthrow of Milosevic 's regime. Even so, destruc-
tive consequences of his policy can be seen even to-
day and their overcoming faces Serbia with huge
challenges. Serbia, a country that has always been
stretched between the West and the East, is passing
today through its serious transformation. For many
years being the object of an oppressive, isolationist
politics that held back the country and region, Ser-
bia is moving to a model of a modern, European in-
tegrated and economically developed country. Most
of the people in Serbia are still traumatized by the
war, long lasting isolation and poverty, Milosevic's
regime propaganda, NATO bombing, distrust to
neighbors. On the other hand, there is a consider-
able part of Serbian population which is educated,
urban, predominantly young and eager to go faster
on the way to the EU. Disagreement between these
two parts of Serbia is a main substantial obstacle to
a more rapid pace on the European path of the coun-
try. Comparing with other transitional countries from
Central and Eastern Europe (where wide consensus
has been agreed among all important actors on main
foreign policy goals: joining the EU and NATO, fa-
cilitating governments in undertaking measures that
would lead to the EU without any fear of harming
the process) Serbia still suffers effects of a constant
tension present during 200 years of modern Serbian
history: clash between conservativism and modern-
ism. Public support to anti-Europeans, on one hand
and democratic political forces, on the other, are
equalized in this moment, albeit a pooling says that
about 70% of Serbians support EU integration. It
looks like a paradox: people want to join Europe,
but without any sacrifice, effort, concession or fun-
damental change. Hence, there is always a Damocles
sword hanging over every democratic, EU-oriented
government in Serbia. The EU integration used as a
tool of pressure on a country or at least as an incen-
tive, could not be effective in the case of Serbia. If
you have a significant part of population absolutely
uninterested in any integration, especially the EU,
you can not use prospect of EU membership as an
instrument of managing fundamental reforms or se-
curing desirable strategic direction of the country.
In complete accordance with this is an opinion that
"we must meet EU integration criteria not because
of us but because ofEU." Some people in Serbia are
lacking a motivation to turn back to obsolete con-
servative mind set and take a new course ahead for
their own and country's sake. But, none can blame
them only. This problem raises a question of educa-
tion, which is not only a case of Serbia, but of the
region as a whole. Absurdly enough, but it is spite,
the main Serbian negative psychological character-
istic, that could serve as a tool for their advanced
change of mindset regarding EU integration. Only
spite can be incentive for common Serbians to do
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something efficient, looking at neighbors like Ro-
mania and Bulgaria, which are still widely consid-
ered as countries at lower level in all respects. Fur-
thermore, the fact that Croatia is standing at the im-
mediate doorstep of EU, and that Serbia is in the
same group with Albania and Bosnia and
Herzegovina is, perhaps, a plausible element to push
things forward. If someone wants to motivate Ser-
bians for this aim, he must talk to them in an under-
standable way. One of the reasons why common Ser-
bians are still reserved concerning the EU integra-
tion idea is a bulk of prejudices came out of a com-
plete lack of information on the EU issues. These
prejudices are widely spread, especially in rural ar-
eas, and are promoted by anti-European oriented
persons. There is even a fear of EU, particularly
among farmers. A joke can be frequently heard on
the EU, saying that the cucumbers in EU have to be
absolutely straight, not twisted. Finally, there is still
a vivid perception of victimization, based on the
premise that the EU is persistently "against us".
The fact that rings the alert is that only 30%
of students in Serbia have travelled abroad and only
3% to any of the EU countries. This is the popula-
tion that has to undertake the main effort of the EU
integration, whose immediate contact with Europe
is a necessary task. There is a usual obstacle though
called: visa. Although it has certain political impli-
cation, visa issue is primarily a technical problem of
the better border control, combating organized crime,
but first of all: trust in institutions. If citizens of Ser-
bia do not trust their own institutions, especially
police, how to expect Brussels to trust them.
Although the problem of unresolved status of
Kosovo does not impede SAP of Serbia and
Montenegro, basically it has a significant impact on
the country and a region as a whole. It is a sensitive
question for Serbs and attempts of pushing forward
the independence ofKosovo would decrease already
fragile support for the EU integration in Serbia. There
are some initiatives to use EU accelerated accession
of Serbia and Montenegro, as an incentive for "co-
operation over the Kosovo issue". "The EU acces-
sion process is the only framework that gives Serbia
real incentives if not to endorse then at least to con-
sent to such a fundamental change in the status of
Kosovo as independence represents" says the port
of the International Commission for the Balkans,
published in April 2005.
There is another challenge for the outcome of
further EU accession process for Serbia and
Montenegro, and it is the future of the State Union.
Although the Belgrade Agreement has been signed
in 2002 and modified by new amendments in April
2005, it suffers all faults that a "genuine" constitu-
tional arrangement, emerged as a fruit of compro-
mises between Serbia, Montenegro and the EU can
bring. Most of all, there is a conspicuous absence of
enthusiasm for making the State Union efficient. It
is not unlikely that a Montenegrin independence ref-
erendum, foreseen for 2006, would seal the fate of
the federation.
As it is the case with Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, cooperation with the ICTY has become
known as a core prerequisite for Serbia and
Montenegro's steady rapprochement with the EU.
Previously, the EU has consistently criticized the
broad coalition government of Vojislav Kostunica
for failing to surrender high-level military figures
indicted for war crimes. Now, having seen that "it
does not hurt", the government of Serbia seems ready
to continue this trend, especially after receiving posi-
tive EU feedback, through the Feasibility Study.
6. Conclusion
The State Union Serbia and Montenegro is at
the point where it is very hard to say that it "is a
tragic story" as the former EU Commissioner Chris
Patten said just a year ago, in German Bundestag.
With the recent enlargement, the EU has become
Serbia's immediate neighborhood. This country sim-
ply cannot "escape" its European future. In the pe-
riod to come, the country's political elites should take
up the opportunity of an offered hand from the EU
and intensify reforms in all fields, especially of eco-
nomic and judicial system, as well as public admin-
istration. Along with this, Serbia must define, in the
long run, its relations with Montenegro and actively
join negotiations relating to the final status of
Kosovo. Serbia and Montenegro have wasted so
much time and there is no excuse for its further waste.
So, time is the core factor for the EU accession of
Serbia and Montenegro. Of course, besides the deci-
siveness of all key actors in Serbia and Montenegro,
desirable consensus, beneficial solution of all burn-
ing status issues, wider information and educational
campaign, the country also needs an additional clear
benevolent approach from EU. The best option for
securing Serbia's and Montenegro's (or Serbia and
Montenegro's) European prospective is to allow it
to submit a formal membership application simulta-
neously with the signing of the SAA. Slovenia did it
in 1996. It could encourage overall reforms and
verify, once and for all, the country's EU vocation,
enabling it to catch up with other possible candidates.
Serbia and Montenegro do not have any other future
except the European. The only problem is that they
should become aware of it.
